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FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN GOVERNMENT
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Regular readers of the United States Reports should not have been
surprised when Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' announced
the fall of federal common law. That concept, enshrined in Swift v. Tyson 2
and venerated for the subsequent century, had met increasingly critical
scrutiny in Mr. Justice Holmes' dissenting opinions for two decades prior
to its demise. 3 Whatever the reasons motivating the Court's adoption of the
Brandeis view, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins revolutionized one part of American
law and has provided an endless source of material for the commentators'
who are, even now, finding new problems raised by that decision .°
That "there is no federal general common law"" still represents the
Supreme Court's position. Yet, even Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing on the same
day that Erie was handed down, acknowledged that there is some form of
federal common law. 7 Later decisions, analyzing the pronouncement, also
generally concluded that there is "for want of a better label, an area of
`federal common law,' "8 or a residuum of federal common law power° in the
federal courts untouched by the Erie decision:
The federal courts have no general common law.... But this is not
to say that wherever we have occasion to decide a federal question
which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone we may not
resort to all of the source materials of the common law, or that
when we have fashioned an answer it does not become a part of the
federal non-statutory or common law.
I do not understand Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie . . . to
deny that the common law may in proper cases be an aid to, or the
basis of, decision of federal questions. In its context it means to me
1
 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
3
 Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532
(1928) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218 (1917) ; Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
4 E.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L.J. 267 (1946) ; Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or
Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 La. L. Rev. 37 (1951) ; Notes,
50 Nw. U.L. Rev. 72 (1955) ; 30 Ore. L. Rev. 164 (1951) ; 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 266 (1956).
5 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964) ; Morgan, The Future of Federal Common Law, 17 Ala. L.
Rev. 10 (1965) ; Notes, 5 B.C. Ind, & Com. L. Rev. 783 (1964) ; 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1084
(1964) ; 50 Va. L. Rev. 1236 (1964).
6 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra note 1, at 78.
7 "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the
two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the
decisions of either State can be conclusive." Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
8 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S, 301, 308 (1947) ; see also, D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 465 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
9 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 666 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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only that federal courts may not apply their own notions of
the common law at variance with applicable state decisions except
"where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States [so]
require or provide. . . ."
Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be
impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-
complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of the
Constitution itself."
Narrowly construed, Erie applies only to diversity cases." This view,
even today, finds strong support as many courts dismiss considerations of
state law if there is no diversity.12 In most of these recent cases, however,
there have been other, more positive, reasons for applying federal law and
the general view today is that the jurisdictional basis is of little importance."
Instead, courts now look to the nature of the right being asserted. If an essen-
tially state-created cause of action is involved, then state law is applied,
regardless of the jurisdictional basis. 14 If, however, the case involves federally-
created rights, then federal law is applied, even if the suit were originally
brought on an assertion of diversity jurisdiction." Although the principle
is clear, its application is difficult since the problem lies in determining, in
each case, which rights are dominantly present.
Applied in many diverse cases, this rapidly developing body of federal
common law has yet to be fully charted: "I doubt that we sufficiently realize
how far this development has gone—let alone where it is likely to go.""
This development has already extended to areas of tort, labor, and commer-
cial law." This comment, however, concerns only the effect of this federal
common law on some species of government commercial paper. Decisions
outside this area enter the discussion only where necessary to keep it within
the realities of the overall growth of federal common law.
10 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, supra note 8, at 469-70 (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
11 Id. at 467.
12
 E.g., United States v. Chester Park Apts. Inc., 332 F.2d 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1964)
(dictum).
13 Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1
(2d Cir. 1956) (dictum) ; 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1084, 1087 (1964).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13, 24 (8th Cir. 1946) ;
Blair v. United States, 147 F.2d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 1995), where the jurisdictional basis was
the Miller Act, 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. 270a (1958).
15
 Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948).
10
 Friendly, supra note 5, at 405.
17 E.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959) (tort) ; United States v. Standard
Oil Co., supra note 8 (tort) ; Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288
(1960) (labor) ; Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S, 448 (1957) (labor) ;
United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949) (government contract) ; United
States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964) (government sub-contract) ; Girard
Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1945) (government lease) ; Levitt v.
Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964) (shareholder's derivative action), noted in 6 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 614 (1965).
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GOVERNMENT CHECKS
After Erie, several cases arose involving the issue of the government's
right to recover for losses occasioned by the wrongdoing of third parties. In
all these cases, a check mailed by a government agency was cashed with a
forged endorsement and passed to the defendant bank, which perfunctorily
guaranteed all prior endorsements and received payment from the United
States. The United States subsequently brought suit to recover, alleging the
defendant's express guarantee of prior endorsements as the basis of its
action.
These early cases illustrate the impact of Erie. In Security-First Nat'l
Bank v. United States," an imposter received a Veterans' Bureau loan,
using the name of a recently deceased veteran. The check was addressed in
the name of the dead man, care of General Delivery, Los Angeles, where the
imposter intercepted it. The Ninth Circuit applied California law, where the
check had been delivered and negotiated. Noting that the United States
neither has nor asserts a preferred status, the court stated that the rights of
holders of United States checks are the same as those accorded by commer-
cial practice to checks of private individuals. Accordingly, the United States
was held estopped from questioning the genuineness of the endorsement. As
an alternative ground for the decision under state law, the court held that
the case came within the "imposter rule,'"° which relieved the defendant
bank of liability.
Almost two years later, state Iaw was again applied without discussion
in United States v. Citizens Union Nat'l Bank,2° and again the defense of
estoppel was upheld against the government because its failure to record
the loss of a veteran's adjusted service certificate had made the subsequent
forgery possible.
These cases typify the phase which the federal courts went through
when their discretionary powers lay dormant and they interpreted
their task as the mechanical application of state law in all cases save those
where the federal Constitution or statutes clearly compelled the use of
federal law.21
 The problem stemmed from the confusion generated by the
Supreme Court's failure to prescribe the boundaries of the Erie doctrine:
In the absence of an authoritative decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States to the effect that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
applies only in cases of diversity of citizenship, a subordinate federal
19
 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939).
19
 "IW]here the drawer delivers a check, draft, or bill of exchange to an imposter
as payee, supposing that he is the person he has falsely represented himself to be, the
imposter's endorsement in the name by which the payee is described is regarded as a
genuine endorsement as to subsequent holders in good faith." Id. at 190.
20 40 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
21 See also United States v. National City Bank, 28 F.Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking—judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't,
63 Colum. L. Rev. 787, 789 (1963); A.L.C., The Common Law of the United States, 47
Yale L.J. 1351, 1352 (1938).
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tribunal would be exhibiting uncalled for temerity in offering such
generalizations.22
With the Supreme Court defining the effect of Erie in other areas,23
however, the Third Circuit cautiously examined the nature of the action in
United States v. Clearfield Trust Ca as and concluded that Erie was not
applicable. The district court, following the trend of the times, had applied
Pennsylvania law and held that the government's unreasonable delay in giv-
ing notice of the forgery to the defendant barred recovery. Pointing to the
absence of diversity jurisdiction, the act of Congress under which the check
had been issued,25
 and the statute making forgery a federal offense,23 the
Third Circuit concluded that these factors sufficiently distinguished the case
from Erie to warrant the application of federal law. In reaching its conclu-
sion that the defendant was liable, the court drew upon an early Supreme
Court case27 in which the United States had been permitted to recover where
there was no showing that the defendant had been harmed by the delay in
receiving notice.
While certiorari in Clearfield was pending because of the conflict with
Security-First Nat'l Bank, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. First Nat'l
Bank28
 also recognized the problem as to the propriety of subjecting the
government's rights and liabilities on its own commercial paper to local law.
But, the absence of either state or federal law in this area rendered the ques-
tion moot, for the court reasoned that under either set of laws the rule would
be drawn from the law merchant, since it considered this to be the uniform law
governing commercial transactions. Drawing upon the law merchant, the
court applied the imposter rule and denied recovery to the government. The
court justified its use of this rule on the grounds that, although the rights
and liabilities of the United States cannot depend upon local law except
insofar as it has consented to be bound, the United States was deemed to
have impliedly consented to be bound by the same rules governing private
persons under the same circumstances when it becomes a party to commercial
paper.
This latter statement is subject to at least two interpretations. First, it
can mean that the government impliedly consents to be bound by the state
laws which would govern in a suit between two private parties in the same
circumstances.29 Taken this way, the language nullifies the court's attempt
earlier in its opinion to render the choice of law question moot. For this in-
22 United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318
U.S. 363 (1943).
23 Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941) ; Deckert v. In-
dependence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) ; Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) ;
Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
24 Supra note 22.
23 Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 55.
25 18 U.S.C. § 262 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1958).
27 United States v. National Exch. Bank, 214 U.S. 302 (1909).
28 131 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1942).
29 See, e.g., United States v. National Rockland Bank, 35 F. Supp. 912 (D. Mass.
1940) ; United States v. National City Bank, supra note 21.
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terpretation, read in the light of the rest of the opinion is, in effect, a con-
clusion that even if federal law were applicable, the government's implied
consent would necessitate adopting state law as the source of any federal
rule which might be applied. Another possible interpretation is that both
parties will be governed by the same rules, but those rules will be federal,
not state." So construed, the United States is hardly consenting to anything.
Since it generally assumes the role of plaintiff in this type of case, it is
unlikely that any rules so formulated to favor the government's position
would ever work against it."
The Supreme Court tacitly approved this second view when it shortly
thereafter endorsed the use of federal law in Clearfield32
 and thus changed
the course of litigation in this area. Reiterating the factors relied upon by
the Third Circuit, and adding others, the Court explained how these factual
differences took Clearfield out of the Erie rule. First, since authority to
issue the check originates in the Constitution and statutes, and in no way
depends upon Pennsylvania law, these, then, are the sources of both the
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it. The
thrust of this argument is that when a sovereign government operates in an
area where it can legitimately function, the validity of its acts should not be
decided by another sovereignty." That the check had been issued for services
rendered under a congressional act reinforced this position.
The desirability of uniformity in this area, however, primarily influenced
the Court's decision to apply federal law. Since the United States issues
commercial paper on a vast scale and transactions will commonly occur in
several states, the Court reasoned that there should be some method to
prevent the fluctuation of the government's rights and duties among the
states.
The determination that federal law controlled precluded state law as a
possible source for the federal rule of decision because the variety of state
rules would cause diverse results under identical circumstances, thus defeating
the uniformity required for the stable operation of the federal government.
In determining the federal rule the Court drew upon the federal law merchant
which had developed under Swift v. Tyson 34
 In so doing, however, it made an
important distinction. While, under Swift, the whole law merchant was
considered a part of federal common law, only the rule itself was incorporated
into the new federal common law by the Clearfield decision. This distinction
exemplifies Mr. Justice Holmes' statement that "the common law is not a
brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.. . ." 35
The primary cause of the loss in the cases just discussed had been the
fraud perpetrated by an unknown third party. The courts now turned to
cases where the fraud had been committed by the government's own em-
s° See, e.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819 (D. Md. 1956).
United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
32
 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
33
 See United States v. McCabe Co., 261 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1958).
34 Supra note 2.
35
 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra note 3, at 222 (dissent).
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ployee. In Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. United States," a government
employee had established a fictitious conservation camp, caused checks to be
issued to non-existent campers, and cashed them at the defendant bank. The
government failed to uncover the fraud until several years after it began.
The United States, rather than relying on Clearfield, conceded that its
rights were the same as any other individual or corporation in the same
position. It contended, however, that the proffered defense of equitable es-
toppel was not appropriate because the government had made no representa-
tion concerning the endorsements and it was therefore the defendant's duty to
determine their genuineness. The court, without reference to Clearfield, applied
the District of Columbia Negotiable Instruments Lawa 7 and directed a
verdict for the United States.
The reasons justifying use of federal law in Clear field were also present
here, however. The government was a party to the action and the decision
directly affected its rights and duties on its commercial paper. There was,
in addition, the element that the conduct of a government employee directly
affected the question. In light of Clearfield, it is difficult to rationalize the
use of state law in Washington Loan. One would think that the government
would have been anxious to press its newly acquired Clearfield rights and
attempt to persuade the court to adopt a favorable federal rule which would
have the advantage of serving as precedent in other litigation. The govern-
ment's hesitancy to assert and the court's reluctance to apply federal law
probably stemmed from the lack of a readily available and easily ascertain-
able federal rule. Although Clearfield would seem to have required this case
to be decided by federal law, it left unanswered many questions, as, for
example, what sources could be employed in formulating the federal rule."
Since state law produced a result favorable to the government, the court
might have reasoned that the defendant would fare no better under federal
law. But Clearfield did not require that the federal rule adopted give the
government a preferred status as creditor." It chiefly intended, as the
Court stated, merely to produce uniformity of decision among the states.
Therefore, the Washington Loan court could have formulated a federal de-
cisional rule relieving the bank of liability in these circumstances."
By exculpating the government from its negligence, however, Washing-
ton Loan encouraged the Supreme Court in National Metropolitan Bank v.
United States" to entrench this rule, which excused what might be termed
"federal negligence," in the new federal common law. A civilian clerk in
the Marine Corps had checks drawn in payment of fictitious travel claims,
forged the endorsements, added his own name as endorser, and cashed
them. The Supreme Court, relying on Clear field, first held that federal cona-
36 134 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
37 D.C. Code Ann. § 28-101 (1961).
38 "In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards." Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, supra note 32, at 367.
8° Id. at 369.
4° Sec United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1943).
41 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
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mon law controlled. This, in effect, amounted to tacit disapproval of Wash-
ington Loan's use of state law; in discussing the federal rule to be applied,
however, the Court proceeded to employ that case as support for the rule it
adopted. Concluding that the general law merchant should again serve as
the source for its rule, the Court noted that this law, which rejects the
government's negligence as a defense, had been applied in an earlier, pre-
Erie Supreme Court decision" and, as evidenced by Washington Loan, had
been almost unanimously accepted. Since "no persuasive reasons have
been suggested .. . why it should not be accepted as the general federal
rule,"43 the Court adopted it.
As in Clearfield, a two-step process occurred here. First, the federal
rights and duties involved were held to warrant application of a federal rule.
Then, the rule, more than merely insuring uniformity, was shaped to meet
the needs of the sovereign government. The Court accomplished this by re-
stricting operation of the rule to the government in its sovereign capacity
rather than in its capacity as drawer of a check. The emphasis was placed
upon protection of federal rights, with little consideration of any equities
which the defendant bank might have.44
Metropolitan Bank firmly established the rule that federal Taw deter-
mined the government's rights in its own commercial paper when the United
States was itself a party to the action." While state law had been applied
without comment in earlier cases," the pendulum had now swung, and courts
commonly applied the new federal common law without extended discussion. 47
Along with establishing federal common law, the Supreme Court had, by its
own actions, indicated two permissible sources from which federal rules
could be drawn: the law merchant and the pre-Erie Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the subject. Approval of this latter source was re-
quired because Erie, holding that the Supreme Court's "course of dealing"
in this area had been unconstitutional, rendered all of its relevant prior de-
cisions potentially worthless as precedent." Using these sources, along with
the discretion which the Supreme Court had intimated could be used in
formulating federal rules of decision," the lower courts now turned to develop-
ing a body of federal law for this area.
Although the Supreme Court had rejected the defenses of estoppe15° and
negligence," it did not deny the existence of some valid defenses. In
Metropolitan Bank, the Court declared:
42 United States v. National Exch. Bank, supra note 27.
43
 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, supra note 41, at 457.
44 Id. at 458.
45 See also United States v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 7.59 (W.D. La.
1946).
43 E.g., Security-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra note 18.
47 See, e.g., Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d
935 (1947).
04 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra note 1, at 77-78. Comment, 47 Yale L, J. 1336,
1337 (1938).
49 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 32.
54° Id. at 369.
51 National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, supra note 41.
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We do not say that there may not be some circumstances, not
now before us, under which the government might be precluded from
recovery because of conduct of a drawer prior to a guarantee of
endorsement."
The lower courts, showing a willingness to sustain defenses, soon
adopted as part of the federal law the "imposter rule" which had been applied
in earlier cases decided under state law and which had its basis in the law
merchant." Now a generally accepted defense," this rule has yet to be
tested in the Supreme Court!'" In adopting it, the courts have found it neces-
sary to distinguish both Clearfield and Metropolitan Bank," the latter on
rather tenuous grounds."
There have been attempts to distinguish Clearfield on other grounds
also. Judge Rives, dissenting in Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States, 58 sug-
gested that Clearfield applies only where the government's delay in giving
notice of the fraud does not harm the defendant's rights against prior en-
dorsers. In Fulton, the state statute of limitations had tolled prior to the
bank's receipt of notice of the fraud, thus cutting off the defendant's right
to bring an action against prior endorsers. This argument has not been
generally advanced, and, when made, has met with small success."
Other than merely recognizing defenses, the lower courts have also
shifted the emphasis from federal rights, as in Clearfield and Metropolitan
Bank, and have considered the defendant's equities" and policy con-
siderations." One of the equitable considerations is that the bank has not
been benefited by accepting the government checks but, rather, accepts
them as a free service. The policy issue arises from the fear that holding banks
liable on government checks would restrict their free alienability. Although
this argument had been successfully advanced in 1942° 2 where state law
was applied, it lay dormant until 1947," and since then has received little
use."
52 Id. at 459.
sa Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 47.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 274 F.2d 366
(9th Cir. 1959) ; United States v. Union Trust Co., supra note 30; Continental-American
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 47.
55 United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, supra note 54, at
368-69.
58 The cases are discussed in Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 250 F.2d 114
(5th Cir. 1957).
57 See United States v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Assn, supra note 54,
at 368.
58 197 F.2d 763, 765 (5th Cir. 1952).
58 But sec United States v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 40.
88 Id. at 686.
° 4 Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra note 56; Continental-American Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 47.
62 United States v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 28, at 989.
113 Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 47.
04 "The necessity for unfettered circulation of the Government's negotiable paper
not only does not require—it actually forbids—that such loss should be visited on the
collecting banks." Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. United States, supra note 56, at 118.
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The future growth of the law seems to lie in these areas. It it now too
clear for argument that federal law should apply in government check
cases. These checks, normally issued by central offices, may be processed
through several states. The banks know they are dealing with federal checks,
but the government cannot, in practice, determine the states through which
its checks will pass. Therefore, it is easier for the banks to comply with
one body of federal law than for the national government to comply with
diverse state laws. Since most government check cases are brought in federal
courts, it is easier for these courts to develop their own body of law than to
decide the cases under state decisional law which may be sparse or non-
existent in this area. 65
Although it is no burden upon the banks to have federal law applied,
it does become onerous when the government receives the status of a pre-
ferred creditor. The Clearfield and Metropolitan Bank decisions effected
this result, but the lower courts have since shown a tendency to ameliorate
its harshness." That banks often handle government checks as a gratuitous
service strongly suggests why the government should make some concessions,
for the burden of handling such a large volume of checks is impliedly recog-
nized in federal regulations which do not require federal reserve banks to
honor government checks presented by the general public."
GOVERNMENT BONDS
When the course of federal law had been set by the Clearfield and
Metropolitan Bank decisions, the Supreme Court moved to contain its de-
velopment within proper bounds. The Court, having pronounced that the
government's commercial rights and duties are to be determined by federal
common law, had yet to indicate the effect of these decisions on suits
between private parties.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 68 involving bonds
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, first demonstrated the extent
to which the rules developed in the government check cases would be applied
when the government itself was not a party. The plaintiff's bonds had
disappeared while being readied for collection and were later cashed by the
defendant. Suit was brought in federal court, alleging diversity jurisdiction.
The district court's application of state law was held erroneous by the court
of appeals, citing Clearfield. Judge Goodrich, dissenting, interpreted Clear-
field to mean that federal law determines the nature of the contract and the
rights and duties of the United States as a party, but does not control the
rights and duties of private transferees among themselves. On appeal,'" the
Supreme Court distinguished Clear field and adopted Judge Goodrich's
position. This action was explained on the grounds that "securities issued by
the Government generate immediate interests of the Government. . . . But
65
 Note, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966, 970 (1946).
66
 See, e.g., United States v. Union Trust Co., supra note 30; Atlantic Nat'l Bank v.
United States, supra note 56.
or 31
	 § 202.25(h) (1959).
66
 226 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1955).
up 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
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they also radiate interests in transactions between private parties." 7° The
Parnell action was purely between private parties and did not touch the
rights and duties of the United States, but involved merely the transfer of
government paper between private persons. The government's only possible
interest was that the floating of securities might be adversely affected by the
application of a local rule governing the liability of a converter. Such a
speculative and remote federal interest did not, in the Court's view, justify
applying federal law to a transaction essentially local.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the Clearfield decision, dissented. He
urged that the federal law merchant should be applied to all transactions
involving government commercial paper, on the ground that the majority
holding would dichotomize disputes, making federal law control some parts
while state law governed others, to the harm of potential litigants who deserve
some certainty on the course litigation might take. He concluded that if the
Clearfield rule be abandoned with respect to some parties, it should be
abandoned altogether. This liberal view no doubt prompted the Court to
limit Clearfield before the law circled back to Swift v. Tyson.
The majority decision expressed ideas implicit in the former Supreme
Court holdings, i.e., that the primary factor controlling the application of
federal law was not the mere presence of government commercial paper in
the litigation but rather that the government's rights and obligations were
directly affected by the outcome. In Parnell, the majority concluded that
the "federal interest" present in the case was too nebulous to warrant ju-
dicial protection. That the court of appeals had reasoned to the opposite
conclusion shows how fine the lines are drawn in determining the nature of
federal interest.
That the dissent in Parnell was prophetic appeared as the uncertainties
predicted by Mr. Justice Douglas came to light in two subsequent actions
involving federal savings bonds. Both cases presented a conflict between
federal regulationsn permitting joint ownership of the bonds with right of
survivorship and state community property laws prohibiting survivorship
arrangements. In the first case, Bland v. Free, 72 a husband had purchased
the bonds with community funds and registered them in co-ownership with
his wife. Upon her death, he claimed complete ownership of the bonds but
his son claimed a one-half interest under the Texas community property
laws. The Texas court, per curiam, held the husband's attempted arrangement
void, and allowed the son to take. This same result had been reached in
other jurisdictions interpreting the federal survivorship regulation as designed
solely to facilitate payment on the bonds for the administrative convenience
of the government. 73 On appeal," federal law was applied to Free because
70 Id. at 33.
71 31 C.F.R. § 315.61 (1959).
72 162 Tex. 72, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). The Texas
decision was based upon Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961) where the
court, relying on Parnell, stated: "It is clear that the Federal regulations do not override
our local laws in matters of purely private ownership where the interests of the United
States are not involved." Id. at 577, 342 S.W.2d, at 570.
73 Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953).
907
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the case involved the construction and application of a federal regulation
having the force of law. Unlike Parnell, the Supreme Court minimized the
essentially private nature of the dispute, emphasizing instead that the dis-
charge of the national debt depends in part upon the successful sale of
bonds and one of the inducements to purchasers was the survivorship pro-
vision. Insofar as state law interfered with this legitimate exercise of federal
power, it had to retreat before the Supremacy Clause. The Court, however,
specified that its decision was limited to the facts and "the doctrine of fraud
applicable under federal law in such a case must be determined on another
day. . . . "75
That day came with Yialchos v. Yiatchos, 76 where testator had registered
the bonds in co-ownership form with his brother. When the brother later
brought suit against the testator's executrix claiming full ownership, testa-
tor's wife claimed a one-half interest. Again, the Supreme Court held that
federal law applied because the construction of a federal statute was at issue.
Federal law was also held to control the issue of fraud. But, in applying the
federal standard on this latter issue, the Court stated it would be guided by
state law insofar as the property interests of the wife created by state law
were concerned. Bonds, the Court intimated, cannot be used as a device to
deprive the wife of state property rights which would not be transferable
but for the bonds' survivorship provisions. Remanding the case, the Court
left open the possibility that the plaintiff-brother would be entitled to only
one-half of the proceeds of the bonds if, under state law, the wife was entitled
to a one-half interest in each individual asset of the estate and if she had
not consented to having plaintiff's name registered as co-owner of the bonds.
The wife had not alleged fraud, but since the facts were stipulated prior to
the decision in Free v. Bland, the Court remanded the case to permit her to
do so.
Problems of fraud aside, the conflict with the federal regulation is just
as evident in Yiatchos as in Free and, following the reasoning used there,
the Supremacy Clause should have been applied with equal force.
The Court, however, apparently decided that, although the Treasury Regula-
tion was intended to prevail over conflicting state laws, it was not intended to
permit bond purchasers to work a fraud under state laws.
Deciding cases in this area upon a balancing of state and federal in-
terests seems particularly inappropriate as the results reached by the Supreme
Court in the cases discussed confirm the futility of attempting to do so.
In three cases, the Court reached three different conclusions. In Parnell,
state law was applied of its own force. In Free, federal law was applied.
Finally, in Yiatchas, the Court again chose state law, but as incorporated into
federal law and not of its own force. The uncertainties thus created may well
have the same adverse effect upon the sale of government bonds which the
Court has been attempting to prevent.
74
 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
73 Id. at 670-71.
76 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
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GOVERNMENT SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Increased participation of the federal government in local affairs has
been matched by a corresponding rise in litigation. While the Supreme Court's
authoritative decisions lent some order to the development of law in the
government check and bond cases, there has been a conspicuous lack of
Supreme Court direction in the area of government secured transactions,
leaving the lower federal courts dependent upon decisions in other juris-
dictions and upon analogous Supreme Court rulings in other areas. Thus,
chronological treatment of the cases is impractical and the cases can best be
classified in terms of the similarity of issues presented.
In United States v. View Crest Garden Apts. Inc.," the lower court,
using state law, had denied the government's application for appointment of
a receiver. On appeal, the defendant sought to sustain the application of
state law because the National Housing Act, 78 under which the loan had
been granted, defines the terms "mortgage" and "mortgage lien" by reference
to state law, showing Congress' intent to apply state law to all phases of
the transaction. Further, the FHA, in practice, uses different mortgage forms
in each state and these forms incorporate many of the state filing provisions.
The Ninth Circuit, holding that federal law applied, separated the secured
transaction into two phases. In the "planning and working" phase, the state
recording provisions and laws defining terms do not interfere with any federal
policy and are adopted by the federal agencies as a matter of commercial
convenience. Once this phase has terminated, however, different consider-
ations arise. Where, as in View Crest, a mortgagor defaults, the commercial
convenience afforded by state laws is no longer significant and the remedies
for breach of a federal duty cannot be limited by local rules. But this does
not mean that the defendant loses all the protection originally afforded by the
state recording laws since a court can weigh the federal and state interests
and, where justice requires, adopt the latter as the federal rule.
The following year, the Ninth Circuit clarified its reasoning in Bumb v.
United States." The defendant trustee in bankruptcy had challenged the
validity of the government's mortgage on grounds it had not been properly
filed under state law. The government contended that the validity of its
mortgage should be resolved by federal law since Small Business Administra-
tion loans were made on a nationwide basis and use of local laws would both
prove, inconvenient and lead to diverse results.
The court distinguished its former holding in View Crest on grounds
that there the issue was what remedies were available to the government
after default, while now the court was merely dealing with the manner of
acquiring a security interest. The objects sought to be achieved in View
Crest were not deemed present. Where there has been a default, protection of
the Treasury takes precedence over commercial convenience resulting from
use of local forms and procedures. But, before default, these local require-
77
 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1959).
78 48 Stat. 1247 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1707 (Supp. V, 1964).
70 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).
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meets do not interfere with the Small Business Act" because the SBA is under
no compulsion to make the loan, and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
California State Bulk Sales Acts' is especially applicable to the SBA
because this agency lends to persons whose creditors most need the protec-
tion afforded by this state act. Since application of federal law would also
have the undesirable effect of overriding a well-established state policy, state
law was applied.
The theory, however, that the secured transaction consists of two phases,
was ignored in Hendry v. United States, 82
 a subsequent decision by the
Ninth Circuit. There, after the defendant had signed as surety on a note
and mortgage given to secure an FHA loan, the agency determined that
administrative regulations bad not been followed and requested the mortgagor
to execute a new note. Before any payments were received on either note,
the mortgagor defaulted. When the United States brought suit, the surety
claimed that his failure to sign the second note relieved him of liability
under state Iaw. The Ninth Circuit rejected this defense, however, and held
that federal law controlled because there was no diversity and the action had
been brought under a federal statute. For the federal rule, the court looked to
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, as generally construed by the
courts. Since the Negotiable Instruments Law had been enacted in Idaho in
its entirety," the only practical effect of applying federal rather than state
law was to expand the inquiry to include decisions of other jurisdictions. The
choice of this uniform act comports with modern thought that federal
decisional rules should freely draw from uniform acts. 84
Following the "two phase" theory, state law should have been applied
since the efficacy of the surety's signature arises at the "planning and
working" phase. Since the same result would be reached under either federal
or state law, it is unlikely that the court was retracting its theory as un-
workable but, instead, was merely confining its operation to cases involving
conflicts with state recording laws and not personal defenses.
Federal law has also prevailed in other jurisdictions. After the trial
court, in United States v. Sylacauga Properties, Inc.," granted a sixth con-
tinuance in a foreclosure action under an FHA loan, the Fifth Circuit held
that federal law controlled and, under that law, the continuance could not
be granted. That the loan affected the government's money and credit was
reason enough for applying federal law. The basis for striking down the
continuance was found in a provision of the National Housing Act requiring
that foreclosure proceedings be instituted within one year. 88
 This, the court
surmised, shows an intent to protect government security from deterioration
80
 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1958),
81 Cal. Civ. Code § 3440.1.
82
 305 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1962).
83
 Idaho Code § 27-801 (1948).
84
 See Reeves Soundcraft Corp., ASBCA Nos. 9030 & 9130 (1964) (mimeographed),
33 U.S.L. Week 2024 (June 30, 1964), noted 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 122 (1964), and
Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
383, 419 (1964).
85 323 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1963).
86 48 Stat. 1252 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1713 (Supp. V, 1964).
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and to expedite the availability of loans to others, and both purposes would
be frustrated by permitting continuances. As an independent ground for the
decision, the court stated that the creditor's reliance on the mortgage pro-
vision giving him the right to immediate foreclosure could not be abrogated by
courts.
The Eighth Circuit reasoned differently but reached similar conclusions
in United States v. Chester Park Apts. Inc.," where the United States was
again seeking appointment of a receiver. The defendant contended that a
mortgage provision waiving all his defenses to such an action was void
under state law and it would be necessary to find actual insolvency as a
fact before a receiver could be appointed. Dismissing Erie because of the
absence of diversity, the court stated that, initially, federal law must be
looked to for determining the controlling source of law. Noting that appoint-
ment of a receiver affects neither title to the property nor the validity of the
mortgage lien, the court found it unnecessary to determine what law would
be applicable in those circumstances. The absence of such factors here,
however, entitled plaintiff to appointment of a receiver. This language sug-
gests that in a later suit for foreclosure, a different result might be reached
as to the applicable law. The qualification was undoubtedly prompted by
earlier decisions involving innocent converters of property subject to a
government security interest,"
Two recent cases involving the defense of coverture show best the
extremes in reasoning employed and have injected some uncertainty as to
the law governing these secured transactions. In both, a husband and wife
had executed chattel mortgages to secure loans granted by the Small Business
Administration. Upon default, the government brought suit against the wife
to recover a deficiency judgment. In the first action, United States v. Helz,"
federal law was applied. The choice resulted from the absence of diversity,
the presence of a federal statute, and particularly the effect the decision would
have on the government's money and credit. Without discussion, the court
fashioned its own rule that coverture was not a valid defense. Since the
property levied upon, however, was held by husband and wife as tenants by
the entirety, and since the federal and state rules conflicted, the court added
that it expressed no opinion on whether the property would be free from
execution under state law.
United States v. Yazeit" reached the other extreme, the Fifth Circuit
concluding that state law applied. Specifically rejecting Helz, the majority
distinguished this action from cases involving commercial paper issued as an
obligation of the United States and viewed it as a simple contract action.
It reasoned that if the wife were held liable, then it would be just as
reasonable to hold insane persons and minors liable on contracts solely be-
cause the government was a party to the contract. There is, of course, no
basis for thus comparing coverture, insanity, and minority, for these de-
87 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1964).
88
 See infra, p. 913.
88 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963).
8° 334 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U. S. L. Week 3245 (U.S. Jan. 19,
1965) (No. 575).
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fenses are easily distinguished. While coverture rests upon the fictional
incapacity of a wife to contract, 91 the defenses of insanity and infancy grow
from defects inherent in the individuals themselves. Thus, federal courts may
draw a rule from the many states which have abolished coverture as a
defense.92 Locating similar sources from which to formulate federal rules
abrogating the defenses of insanity and infancy would prove difficult.
The dissenting opinion in Yazell concentrated upon the practicalities of
applying a federal rule. Judge Prettyman pointed out that if local rules were
allowed to govern here, then they should also govern all other aspects of
contractual capacity. Further, the holding in this case would be equally
applicable to other loan programs with the possible result of nullifying many
of them. Judge Prettyman further suggested that "if a person has capacity
to get money from the Federal Government, he has the capacity to give it
back . . . [and] the federal rule ought to be that you must repay what
you borrow."93 He also felt that uniformity was necessary to effectuate the
policy of the act requiring reasonable assurance of repayment.
Where the litigation has placed the government in the position of a
creditor competing with other creditors of the mortgagor for priority, the
decisions applying federal law have often rested upon a federal statute. In
United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co.," a foreclosure action, the United States
claimed a superior lien under the terms of the mortgage creating the Iien,
while the defendant, another creditor, claimed that state law gave him
priority for sums advanced subsequent to the government's mortgage used
to make improvements upon the property. The court, first holding that the
question was to be resolved by federal law, concluded that the federal lien
was superior. This conclusion rested upon an interpretation of the Defense
Production Act of 195095 under which the loan was granted. Put in syllogistic
form, the argument runs that the Constitution gives Congress the power to
provide for defense and makes federal statutes supreme. The Defense Act,
giving the Government authority to prescribe the conditions of the loan, is
a statute exercising this power. Therefore, the conditions so prescribed pre-
empt conflicting state statutes.
Similarly, in W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc.," the Fourth
Circuit affirmed a judgment giving the government's lien priority over the
defendant's mechanic's lien on the rarely used ground that the federal in-
solvency statute" applies and, under the Supremacy Clause, takes precedence
over conflicting state law. In the same year, the Tenth Circuit also invoked
the Supremacy Clause in Southwest Engine Co. v. United States," and ap-
plied the federal rule, borrowed from the law merchant, that "the first in
time [is the] first in right."99
 Here again, the government was competing
81 26 Am. Jur. Husband & Wife § 19 (1940).
82 Id. at § 20.
93 United States v. Yazell, supra note 90, at 456.
94 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957).
85
 64 Stat. 798, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2061 (1958).
56 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963).
97 R.S. § 3466, 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
98 275 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1960).
88 Id. at 107.
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against the defendant's mechanic's lien, but the case differs from Latrobe
and Foodco Realty in that the conflict was between a state statute and a
federal decisional rule rather than between a state statute and a federal
statute.
These decisions demonstrate that courts have distinguished the cases
upon a combination of factors, including (a) the parties involved, (b) the
type of relief sought, (c) the point in time at which the issue arises, and
(d) the type of defense sought to be employed.
Since the nationwide government loan programs are in large measure
locally administered, the underlying question in many cases is the extent
to which these agencies should be required to know local law and the extent
to which they should be held to have impliedly consented to be bound by
local rules. Although there is little imposition in requiring these agencies to
know and comply with local filing provisions which are, in part, incorporated
into their mortgage forms, this principle does not extend to every obscure
state law. The same reasons for holding banks to a knowledge of federal
law seem equally forceful here. This does not work any imposition on
creditors since the federal rule that the "first in time is the first in right"
protects creditors who have taken action without knowledge of the federal
interest in the property and relying upon the priority afforded them by
state recording laws.
INNOCENT CONVERTERS
The cases in this area generally arose under the now repealed Bank-
head-Jones Farm Tenant Actl" and followed a similar fact pattern. An
FHA loan was secured by a filed chattel mortgage on livestock. The
mortgagor, breaching the mortgage provisions, gave the livestock to the
defendant, a commission agent, who sold them in the ordinary course of
business, deducted his commission, and remitted the proceeds to the mort-
gagor. The United States, upon discovering the conversion, brought suit
against the defendant to collect the full value of the livestock.
In United States v. Matthews,'" the district court rejected California
law under which the defendant would have been liable for the entire pur-
chase price of the livestock. It instead held that federal law applied, and that
the governing law was "the common law prevailing in the federal courts. "102
Relying upon one federal case,"° 3
 the defendant was held liable only for
his commission. This result was recognized as being contrary to the usual
case since the United States, as plaintiff, generally profits by the denial of
a defense under local law.'" On appea1, 105 the Ninth Circuit agreed that
federal law controlled, but held that the weight of federal authority made
the defendant liable for the full value of the livestock.
100
 50 Stat. 527 (1937).
101
 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal.
102 Id. at 688.
102 Drovers' Cattle Loan & Inv
"4 But Murphy, J., had no
Federal plaintiff as gander ought to
Matthews, supra note 101, at 690.
"5 United States v. Matthews,
1956),
244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957).
. Co. v. Rice, 10 F.2d 510 (N.D. Iowa 1926).
qualms about the result: "What is sauce for the
be sauce for it when it is the goose." United States v.
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This case loses much of its precedential value since both parties had
agreed upon appeal that federal law should apply. The concurring opinion
also saps much of the strength from the decision, pointing out that the
result would be the same under both state and federal law.
No stipulation as to the governing law was made in United States v.
Kramel,'" however, and the choice of law there determined the outcome.
The government contended that federal law should be applied for two
reasons. First, the FHA program is nationwide and requires uniform ad-
ministration. Secondly, the federal statute creating a remedy against
criminal converters 107 shows a congressional intent to protect against in-
nocent conversions as well. The defendant, conversely, contended that the
state Iaw applied. The court, holding that federal law controlled because
Erie is limited to cases of diversity, then proceeded to apply state law
without clarifying whether this law was incorporated as part of the federal
law or whether it applied of its own force. Its selection was based first on
the fact that the Bankhead-Jones Act neither explicitly nor impliedly dis-
placed state law, showing that Congress did not deem uniformity necessary.
Secondly, the action was essentially one in tort; thirdly, it affected local
property interests. Since these last two matters normally fall under state
law, the court felt the need for compelling reasons before displacing it. No
such reasons were offered. On similar grounds, the federal statute was held
not to extend to innocent conversions.
United States v. Union Livestock Sales Corp. 108 produced reasoning
similar to that in Kramel, but there the court made no pretense of applying
federal law. After the chattel mortgage had been recorded in Ohio, the
mortgagor removed his cattle to West Virginia where the defendant sold
them on a commission basis in the ordinary course of business. The court
emphasized that the transfer was of private property by private owners and
controlled by state law. It dismissed the need for uniformity on grounds
that the interests of both the government and the borrower are protected
and preserved if local law, with which both are familiar, were applied. In
support of this, the court gave Bankhead-Jones a novel interpretation, stating
that its general purpose—to aid the farming community—would be fostered
if the loans were made in accordance with local practice. This purpose
was found not in the act itself, but in all the surrounding circumstances:
Whether or not this inference may justifiably be drawn from the
statute itself, we think the circumstances justify the court in choos-
ing the state law as the appropriate federal rule to be applied to
the loan transaction.'°9
Even though state law was applied, however, the defendant was held liable,
as he would undoubtedly have been under federal law."°
The same type of mortgage had been filed under Pennsylvania law in
100 234 F,2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956).
107 18 U.S.C. 658 (Supp. V, 1964).
108 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962).
100 Id. at 759.
110 See United States v. Matthews, supra note 105.
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United States v. Sonzmerville," 1
 containing a provision expressly giving the
United States the right to proceed under the Pennsylvania Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 112
 The majority found the requisite federal interest present
based upon the statutes, regulations, and executive orders in the field. This
argument, that federal law "blankets the field," was first expressed in Clear-
field. Other factors relied upon in concluding to the existence of a sufficient
federal interest were the Bankhead-Jones Act under which creation of the
security interest was authorized and the power of the United States to
protect its purse. This power was deemed to be "paramount here and .. .
paramountly federal.'"" The court did make one concession toward state
law, however. In dictum, it stated that Pennsylvania law would be used to
decide whether or not the government's security interest had been per-
fected. But, once perfected, federal law determines the consequences. As
guidelines for determining these consequences, the court stated that the
genesis of the rights and duties of the parties is to be found in the act, "and
absent express congressional declaration of intent that state law shall be
applicable, we are reluctant to subject federal rights and duties to the ex-
ceptional uncertainty and heterogeneity which may ensue in many cases. 1114
Examining the general law and finding that the weight of authority favored
imposing liability here, the court proceeded to do likewise.
The concurring opinion thought the result unobjectionable because the
outcome would be the same under state law, but doubted the propriety of
applying federal law. Admitting that, in a broad sense, the act did produce
the rights, nevertheless, the immediate rights stem from Pennsylvania law
to which the parties to the mortgage had bound themselves. Since this, then,
is the source of the government's possessory rights, it is only natural that
this law should also determine the consequences. In short, the concurring
opinion felt that the practical necessities of uniformity and protection of
federal law were outweighed by the lien's intrusion upon property relation-
ships which are traditionally governed by state laws.
These decisions are difficult to harmonize, but the results reached can
often be explained by looking at the manner in which each court has classified
the action. Where viewed as essentially contractual, federal law has been
applied; when regarded as essentially a property tort action, local law has
controlled.
A fact that has gone unnoticed in both Matthews and Sommerville is
that they were the first instances in which the new federal common law
was applied to defendants who entered a commercial transaction without
actual notice of the government's interest. This extension of federal common
law had previously been made in tort cases," 5 but such cases lack the
element of reliance present in commercial transactions. Not only were the
defendant commission agents unaware of any federal interest, but their
ability to ascertain true ownership of the livestock was hindered in part by
111 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963).
112 Pa. Stat. Ann. lit. 12A(1954).
113 United States v. Sommerville, supra note 111, at 716.
114 Id. at 717.
115 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S, 301 (1947).
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a federal statute requiring them to offer non-discriminatory services "upon
reasonable request." 1" It therefore seems anomalous to have adopted a
federal rule compelling them to pay a governmental agency for this livestock.
The government's remedy should have been, instead, in discouraging the
mortgagor from selling by strengthening the penalties attached to the federal
statute making such conversions a criminal offense.'"
CONCLUSION
Application of federal common law to government commercial paper
was briefly interrupted by the confusion generated by Erie, but since then
has been applied with renewed force. By recognizing the government's need
for uniformity because of the presence of a strong federal interest, the
courts have accorded to the federal government the same advantages which
Erie made available to private litigants. In this respect, the Clearfield doc-
trine is not an exception to Erie but rather a compatible corollary. While
Erie accomplished the desirable aim of preventing forum shopping in the
trial of state issues, Clearfield and subsequent government commercial
paper cases have accomplished this same result in trials of federal issues.
Where state interests are concerned, the need is for uniformity within the
states, while the presence of federal interests creates the need for uniformity
among the states. This latter has been accomplished without defeating the
purpose of Erie since federal decisional law applies in state courts with equal
force in government commercial paper cases.
Future development lies in two areas. First, in more clearly defining
what constitutes a "sufficient federal interest" requiring application of federal
common Iaw; secondly, in building up a body of federal decisional rules.
At present, the federal interest is determined primarily by the presence of
federal statutes and acts, the congressional intent drawn from these, and the
government's persistence in a need for uniformity. Where the government
must know the law before taking or refraining from action, this argument
for uniformity is justified. But the government has sapped some of the
strength from the argument by advancing it in cases where there is no real
need for uniformity and its chief aim was to achieve the position of a
preferred creditor.
As for rules likely to be developed, again the congressional intent culled
from the federal statutes and acts will prevail by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause; but where the statutes and acts are silent, all the surrounding cir-
cumstances will be taken into consideration in forming such rules including
the defendant's equities, policy considerations, and the effect the rule will
have upon strong state interests. In so doing, uniform acts should receive
more attention and application.
JOSEPH F. RYAN
116 42 Stat. 164 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 205 (1958).
117 18 U.S.C. § 658 (Supp. V, 1964).
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